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DLD-177 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




DAVID GEORGE LUSICK, 
Appellant
v.
DAVID C. LAWRENCE, Court Administrator;
JOSEPH H. EVERS, Prothonatary;
VIVIAN T. MILLER, Clerk of Quarter Sessions;
NATASHA LOWE, Post Trial Supervisor;
SETH WILLIAMS, District Attorney*;
HUGH J. BURNS, District Attorney;
JUDGE PAMELA PRYOR COHEN DEMBE, President
* (Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 43(c)(2))
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 09-05581)
District Judge:  Honorable Legrome D. Davis
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
April 22, 2010
Before: FUENTES, JORDAN and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed:  April 29, 2010)
     “Section 1405 sets forth the procedure by which a private individual can seek to have1
a district attorney convicted of a misdemeanor in office and remove him or her from
office based on willful and gross negligence in the execution of the duties of his or her






Following a jury trial in 1994, David Lusick was convicted of several crimes in the
Court of Common Pleas for Philadelphia County. He was sentenced to an aggregate term
of 12-35 years’ imprisonment. According to Lusick, in November 2007, he attempted to
file a misconduct complaint under 16 P.S. § 1405 against then-District Attorney of
Philadelphia Lynne Abraham and several subordinates in her office.  Apparently,1
Lusick’s complaint was never docketed by the Philadelphia Clerk of Quarter Sessions, so
he refiled it in August 2009.
In December 2009, Lusick filed the instant civil rights complaint in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Therein, Lusick alleged that
his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process were violated when his
original § 1405 complaint was mishandled by the Philadelphia Clerk of Quarter Sessions.
He alleged that the mishandling was the product of a conspiracy concocted by the various
public officials and judicial employees named in the instant suit. Lusick also requested
     Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).2
     We have jurisdiction to review both orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and Fed. R.3
App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010). We
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of Lusick’s
complaint for failure to state a claim. Id. at 670. We review for abuse of discretion the
District Court’s order denying Lusick’s Rule 59(e) motion. Id. at 669.
3
injunctive relief and that the District Court “take supplemental jurisdiction” over his §
1405 proceedings.
Invoking the Younger  abstention doctrine, the District Court sua sponte dismissed2
Lusick’s complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. The District Court stated that “[b]ecause plaintiff’s
misconduct case is ongoing in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, this Court, in
deference to the principles of comity and federalism will not interfere in the state judicial
process absent a showing of irreparable injury, a ‘flagrant and patent’ violation of an
express constitutional prohibition, or other extraordinary circumstances warranting
equitable relief,” and that “[t]he facts alleged by plaintiff do not meet these
requirements.” Lusick then filed a motion to alter or amend the District Court’s judgment
pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, contending that the
District Court misapplied Younger. The District Court denied Lusick’s motion,
concluding that he had not met the standard for relief under Rule 59(e). Lusick appealed
from both the District Court’s orders.3
Having granted Lusick leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we must dismiss his
     See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).4
     See LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.5
     See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).6
     Lazaridis, 591 F.3d at 670.7
4
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) if it has no arguable basis in law.4
Alternatively, we may take summary action if it clearly appears that Lusick’s appeal
presents no substantial questions.  We may affirm the District Court on any basis that5
finds support in the record.6
At the outset, we conclude that the District Court erred in its application of
Younger abstention. Younger abstention is appropriate only when three requirements are
satisfied: “(1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state
proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an
adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims.”  The last of these requirements is not7
satisfied here.
As Lusick noted in his filings below, his § 1405 complaint concerned perceived
misconduct by the former District Attorney of Philadelphia and her subordinates related
to Lusick’s 1994 trial and conviction. The scope of proceedings brought under 16 P.S.  
§§ 1405 and 1406 is limited: only the district attorney’s alleged personal misconduct is at
issue. By contrast, Lusick’s federal civil rights suit is rooted in the alleged failures of
certain court personnel to docket Lusick’s § 1405 complaint. Lusick argues that the
     Liability under § 1405 must be based on the District Attorney’s personal conduct, and8
cannot be based on a respondeat superior theory. See Wilkins v. Marsico, 903 A.2d 1281,
1286 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). 
     Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).9
     Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).10
     See id. at 1950.11
     Id. at 1949.12
5
mishandling of his complaint amounted to violations of his federal due process rights. Of
the seven named defendants in the federal suit, at least six would be inapt defendants in
misconduct proceedings brought under 16 P.S. § 1405.  We fail to see how Lusick could8
raise his due process claims in the § 1405 case against the majority of the defendants in
the instant civil rights action.
Despite the District Court’s error, we will affirm its judgment because Lusick’s
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In order to survive
dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  The plausibility standard “asks for more than9
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”  Well-pleaded factual content10
is accepted as true for purposes of determining whether the complaint states a plausible
claim for relief.  Moreover, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads11
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.”  12
     See Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208, 1221 (3d Cir. 1987) (“Proof of prejudice13
is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim.”) (citations
omitted).
     D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1377 (3d14
Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted); see also Capogrosso v. Supreme Ct. of N.J., 588
F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“allegations of a conspiracy must provide
some factual basis to support the existence of the elements of a conspiracy: agreement
6
Based on the spare allegations in Lusick’s complaint, we cannot reasonably infer
that his due process rights were violated when his original § 1405 complaint was not
properly docketed. Instead, the most plausible inference from his allegations (favorable to
Lusick) is that he was the victim of a bureaucratic blunder, which is surely not a federal
due process violation. The correspondence Lusick attached to his complaint directly
supports that inference.  
But even if we could infer the existence of fundamentally unfair conduct by the
public officials named in Lusick’s suit, the complaint does not identify how Lusick was
prejudiced by that conduct.  Specifically, notwithstanding any actions or inaction by13
court personnel, Lusick was eventually able to file his § 1405 complaint. Moreover,
Lusick does not suggest that the complaint was ruled untimely or otherwise procedurally
defective for a reason attributable to the defendants in the instant action. We also cannot,
without more, infer some sort of conspiracy hatched by employees of the Philadelphia
Clerk of Quarter Sessions and various judicial officers to violate Lusick’s civil rights:
“mere conclusory allegations of deprivations of constitutional rights are insufficient to
state a § 1985(3) claim.”  Furthermore, Lusick’s reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 24114
and concerted action.”) (quoting Crabtree v. Muchmore, 904 F.2d 1475, 1481 (10th Cir.
1990)). 
     Cf. United States v. Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 199 (3d Cir. 1980).15
     See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008) (“In the event16
a complaint fails to state a claim, unless amendment would be futile, the District Court
must give a plaintiff the opportunity to amend her complaint.”); see also Shane v. Fauver,
213 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000).
(criminalizing conspiracy to impede the exercise of federal rights) is inappropriate, as that
statute does not give rise to a cognizable federal claim in a civil suit.    15
The District Court failed to either (A) grant Lusick leave to amend, prior to its sua
sponte dismissal of the complaint, or (B) speak to the inequity or futility of amendment.16
It should have done one or the other. We have considered the possibility of amendment,
however, and conclude that it would be futile. 
Accordingly, because this appeal presents no substantial question, and because
Lusick’s complaint fails to state a viable due process claim, we will summarily affirm the
District Court’s judgment.
